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Will the 2011 uprisings lead to democratization in the Arab world and what 
role will Islamist movements play in that process? This important question 
exercises analysts of the Middle East, policy makers and, more importantly, 
the citizens of the region. It also provides a unifying theme for the three 
works reviewed here. 
The question is one of many that can be asked about the impact of the 
2011 uprisings on the Middle East region. In dealing with it, we must steer 
between the Scylla of Western-centrism and the Charybdis of Middle 
Eastern exceptionalism. On the one hand, we cannot fall victim to the 
Western obsession with democracy that Anderson identified in her seminal 
and still prescient article (2006) as bedevilling US Middle Eastern studies 
and skewing scholarly analysis of the region’s politics. On the other hand, 
we cannot presume that in the Middle East democracy ‘does not matter’ or 
that it matters less than in other parts of the world. The Arab uprisings of 
2011 showed that democracy does matter in the Middle East region. 
Although the popular demand for it was not expressed under the 
‘democracy’ label as such, the substance of it lay behind the calls for 
‘dignity’ which, alongside ‘social justice’, constituted the main demands of 
the demonstrators. In 2011, the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, 
Yemen and Syria, and in other parts of the Arab world, erupted in fury 
against the lack of accountability, arbitrariness, tyrannical practices and 
arrogance of the authoritarian 
 
 regimes that ruled over them. What else but the institutions of a democratic 
polity would remove such types of behaviour and achieve decent 
governance? 
Four years after the outbreak of the uprisings, the Middle East region has 
been transformed in (predictably) unexpected ways – a point to which I will 
return below – but the question of democratization remains. Given their 
prominent role in the political developments which followed the uprisings – 
though not in the uprisings themselves, which they did not lead – it is 
legitimate to focus our attention on Islamist movements. The question asked 
by interested observers is: in those contexts where a democratization process 
has occurred in the post-2011 Arab world, have Islamists been playing and 
will they play a positive or negative role? Behind it lies a broader question: 
Can Islamist movements and, by extension, Islamist political parties espouse 
democratic norms and, if so, can we see instances where they have, in fact, 
espoused them? The latter question predates the uprisings by years and even 
decades and has been an important aspect of the academic literature and 
wider public debate on political Islam. It has also informed the research 
underpinning the books reviewed here. In these three works, as elsewhere, 
the answers given to these questions diverge widely and sometimes depend 
more on the predispositions of the observers than on the cool observation of 
empirical reality. 
Kamran Bokhari’s and Farid Senzai’s Political Islam in the Age of 
Democratization aims ‘to assess the role of religion in politics within 
Muslim societies, especially in light of the transformational changes taking 
place since the Arab Spring’ (p. 185). The authors offer a theoretical 
discussion of democratization and political Islam, and various typologies of 
Islamists (see pp. 26 – 30), finally settling for ‘participators’, ‘rejecters’ and 
‘conditionalists’ (pp. 44 – 7) as the book’s organizing principle. Chapters 4 – 
10 examine, over the three periods of the 1990s, the 2000s and the post-2011 
years, Islamist movements which participate in democratic systems (the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Arab Shia parties), those 
that reject it (al-Qaeda and the Taliban) or accept it with conditions (the 
Salafis). The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), a ‘secular 
party’ (p. 173), is treated under the special category of ‘post-Islamism’. 
The reader is left somewhat uncertain about the book’s main argument. Is 
it that Islamists will participate in democratization in some way or other, 
generally and in the post-2011 Middle East? The book’s Conclusion states: 
‘Our central argument is that Islamists have played a decisive role and will 
continue to do so in the years and decades ahead as the region  transitions  
through  this  democratization  process’  (p. 185). If so, this is a rather 
 obvious and general statement. Or is the book’s main argument that Islamists 
are becoming more moderate and will play a positive role in the 
democratization process? If so, the evidence to back it up is not really 
provided. For one thing, the authors’ assumption that ‘democratization’ – a 
word which inherently contains the idea of transition – is taking place in the 
region, is not really borne out by events. The authors refer to ‘the current 
Islamist-led transitions’ (p. 38) but not a single one such remains in the 
Middle East following the July 2013 military coup which overthrew the 
Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Cairo, the Tunisian parliamentary 
and presidential elections of October– December 2014 and the chaos in 
Libya. Even if we assume that democratization will eventually take place, 
at least in some Middle Eastern countries, and that Islamists will inevitably 
play a role in it, there is no evidence in the book to support the authors’ 
claim that ‘the majority [my italics] of Islamists are participatory with regard 
to democracy’ (p. 189). If the Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab Shia Islamists 
and elements of the Salafis in Egypt comprise the ‘participatory’ category, it 
is not made clear how and why these constitute a ‘majority’. This is an 
important distinction: it is one thing to argue that Islamism in the Middle 
East is becoming ‘participatory’ with regard to democracy, and quite another 
to say that one strand within it is doing so – the implication being that other 
Islamist strands could be going the opposite way. 
The book raises the further issue of whether Islamist participation in the 
democratic process entails the espousal of democratic norms and how one 
understands these norms. There is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which is analysed in Chapter 4, is a ‘participatory’ Islamist movement, in the 
sense that it has chosen to play by the formal rules of the democratic game. 
However, although the authors write that the Brotherhood is ‘committed to 
the democratic process’ (p. 76), they also state that ‘it has still not 
internalized democratic norms’ (p. 77). A clearer distinction between 
democratic and liberal norms – specifically whether by ‘democratic’ norms 
they mean ‘liberal-democratic’ or equate democracy with majority rule – 
would have sharpened their argument. 
Bokhari and Senzai can be careless with their references and, at times, 
sweeping in their statements. They make numerous references to ‘Western 
academia’ as if it is a uniform body. For instance, they maintain that ‘the 
idea that Islamists might have something meaningful to contribute to the 
political discourse is unfathomable’ (p. 1) and that ‘Western thinkers have 
long considered secularism as a precondition for democracy’ (p. 8). Both 
statements pass over the profound disagreements within Western academia, 
if such a thing indeed exists, over these issues – evident in Jocelyne Cesari’s 
 book, to give but one example – and the latter, in particular, ignores the 
extensive debates on religion, secularism, de-secularization and post- 
secularism of the past few years. 
Reading Bokhari and Senzai’s references to ‘Western academia’ alongside 
Shadi Hamid’s assessment of it in Temptations of Power: Islamists and 
Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East is a disconcerting experience. For 
Hamid, the straw man called ‘Western academia’ is an altogether different 
guy! Hamid assures us that Western academics have all too easily accepted 
the thesis that ‘political participation leads to moderation’. This may, indeed, 
be a widespread view among students of political Islam and some policy 
makers, particularly in the United States, but it is by no means the uniform 
position on the subject that Hamid makes it out to be (for a critique, see 
Dalacoura, 2011). 
Against this alleged consensus in ‘Western academia’, Hamid argues that 
repression, rather than inclusion, leads to moderation. His evidence in drawn 
from research carried out in 2004 – 06, 2008 and 2010 – 13. He examines 
Islamism in the 1980s, the 1990s and 2000s (Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
respectively). The second half of the book covers the Arab Spring (Chapters 
6 – 8), the focus here being Tunisia and Egypt. Besides his core argument, 
the author develops the additional position that Islamist movements may 
have become more ‘moderate’ but have not, in fact, genuinely democratized, 
adopting, instead, the trappings of democracy and liberalism for tactical 
reasons. The book ends with a clear statement that Islamism and liberalism 
are irreconcilable (p. 188). A final chapter on ‘the Tunisian exception?’ 
confirms the author’s scepticism. For Hamid, it is not only that moderation, 
in the sense of democratization, has not taken place within Islamism – but 
that it can never do so. 
Like Bokhari and Senzai’s volume, Hamid’s book would have been well-
served by a clear conceptual distinction, at the start, between the exigencies 
of democracy and liberalism. If democracy is simply defined as majority 
rule, then the term ‘illiberal democrat’ (p. 173) is an appropriate one for 
describing many Islamist groups. However, the author does not use the terms 
democracy and liberalism consistently throughout the work. As for the term 
‘moderate’, it is not always equated with ‘democratic’ or ‘liberal’ in the 
relevant literature, as he maintains. Similarly to the idea of a ‘political 
centre’, ‘moderation’ is, or should be, always (not only sometimes, as he 
claims on pp. 46 – 7) a relative term: a moderate movement in one political 
and social context would look very different from a moderate movement in 
another context. 
 Hamid argues that repression has not led to genuine democratization or 
liberalization but the tactical and hypocritical adoption of liberal and 
democratic principles by Islamist groups. Arguably, including Islamists in 
the political process – rather than repressing them – could have led to a more 
genuine endorsement of liberal and democratic values. Hamid would 
probably not agree with this suggestion but the question is why. In a 
revealing passage, he contrasts the Islamists in the Middle East with the 
leftists in Chile who did, he argues, sincerely adopt liberal and democratic 
values as a result of Pinochet’s repression. For Hamid, Islamist groups are 
‘fundamentally different from traditional political parties’ (p. 49); Islamism 
is a particular type of ideology, a special case, which can never be reconciled 
with liberal and democratic principles. 
Hamid castigates Islamists for having one thing in their hearts and saying 
and doing something else when they are in power (p. 218). One wonders 
why this is different from politicians of other hues, the world over (the 
author touches on this but does not follow its implications through). Peering 
into people’s souls for evidence and assuming a direct link between values 
with behaviour is a tricky business. The broader question here – linked to 
how we understand the prerequisites of democracy, a question I will turn to 
in the conclusion – is whether Islamists will play a positive role in a 
democratic process only if they sincerely adopt democratic principles or, 
alternatively, by virtue of their constituting one of many centres of political 
power. 
In contrast to Hamid, my view is that the plasticity of religion – Islam 
included – is enormous, if not infinite, and that Islam in particular has the 
potential to be reconciled with democratic and liberal principles. This is not 
to say that at this historical juncture Islamists have liberalized and 
democratized: for a variety of historical and socio-political reasons (some of 
which are suggested by Cesari’s work, discussed below) they have not, 
although a number of them have taken steps in that direction, i.e. they have 
become increasingly willing to participate in the democratic game. 
Hamid’s book is verbose and sometimes prone to platitudes, but it is very 
readable. The author’s reference to ‘hundreds’ of interviews does not bode 
well. However, it soon becomes clear that he has a good feel for his subject 
and the book is interspersed with anecdotes of considerable insight which are 
used in support of the argument. One example is his observation, in the 
Egyptian electoral campaign of 2011, of the public’s lack of interest in 
political issues and its obsession with ‘morality’ (p. 18). Here again, 
however, one wonders whether the dramatic groundswell of opinion against 
the Muslim Brotherhood during its year in power, due to its failures in 
 addressing tangible security and economy problems, means that, ultimately, 
politics did trump ‘morality’. 
Jocelyne Cesari’s work, The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, 
Modernity, and the State, is a game of two halves. Part I of the book shows 
that Islam’s politicization in the modern Middle East started with the process 
of state formation in the region, and specifically through the appropriation of 
Islam by the state for the purposes of nation-building. This is not a new 
argument but Cesari’s important contribution is to demonstrate it in detail 
and emphasize that the co- optation of Islam was carried out even by secular 
regimes. In four dense, impressive chapters (3 – 6), Cesari describes the 
nationalization of Islamic institutions and the role of Islam in the 
constitutions, the legal systems and the national educational curricula of 
Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, Turkey and Pakistan. The building of a hegemonic 
Islam led to the ‘invention of Islam as a modern religion’ (p. 110) and the 
moralization of the public order. Through this process, aspects of pre-
modern Muslim societies, such as gender, conversion and blasphemy, which 
had been part of the social sphere, became politicized. In the author’s words, 
the increased social and political visibility of Islam is not caused by an 
increase in beliefs. People are not stronger believers than they used to be, but 
their identification to belonging and behaving has certainly shifted. It means 
that collective identifications and public norms are reshaped by Islamic 
values or principles and vice-versa, even in the case of secular regimes such 
as Turkey, Tunisia, or Pakistan. (p. 117) Part II of the book argues that ‘the 
intertwined fabric of the state and Islam explains why Islamism became the 
major political force in most Muslim countries’ (p. 120) and that ‘Islamism 
can be interpreted as an amplification of the framing and pruning of Islam by 
the authoritarian state’ (p. 121). The careful demonstration of this argument 
– the causal mechanisms whereby a hegemonic Islam turns into an 
oppositional Islam – should have been, in my view, the key contribution of 
the book but the promise is only partly fulfilled. Chapter 7, for example, 
argues that Islamist movements turned against incumbent regimes after 
rising through Islamic institutions, such as mosques and religious festivals, 
and other loci of religious authority, which ‘indirectly provided venues for 
political opposition’ (p. 123). What is not fully explained is why these 
institutions escaped the control of the state and, more importantly, what 
fuelled the oppositional drive of these movements to existing governments. 
Cesari argues that ‘religious norms and references cannot be completely 
controlled by the state’ (p. 115) but no more is offered on this tantalizingly 
insightful comment. 
Instead of a meticulous exposition of how and why Islam, initially co-opted 
 by the state, is then adopted by oppositional groups which turn against it, 
Part II offers a general description of Islamic parties (in Chapter 7, though 
the chapter is purportedly about Islamic institutions), a rather broad 
discussion of Islamist ideology (Chapter 8) and of Islamist techniques of 
social mobilization (Chapter 9). The analysis goes back a few decades, as it 
should; however, the author is also constantly tempted to tell the story of the 
Arab Spring and its aftermath. This is interesting and useful in itself, of 
course, particularly because of the detailed information Cesari has amassed, 
but occasionally becomes a digression from the main argument, especially as 
only two of Part I’s five case studies (Tunisia and Egypt) experienced major 
upheavals in 2011. 
In Part III, Cesari introduces the concept of ‘unsecular democracy’, 
defined as a political system where civil liberties and democratic institutions 
and practices, such as ‘free and fair elections, the right to political opposition 
and organization, the right to express political opinions, and freedom of the 
press (to a certain extent)’, are respected; but where religious symbols, ideas 
and rituals are prominent and also inscribed in the law; and the ‘rights 
granted to the person, from sexual freedom to the right to exit or criticize 
Islam’, what the author calls ‘the rights of the self’, are limited (p. 240). The 
author argues that ‘the institutionalization of Islam and its public presence 
need not be an obstacle to successful democratization’ (p. 237), although it 
must be noted that this rests on the distinction between democratic and 
liberal politics (p. 239). Turkey and Pakistan are mostly dropped and the 
discussion focuses on developments following the Arab Spring in Egypt and 
Tunisia and, in the case of Iraq, events of recent years. 
The applicability of the concept of ‘unsecular democracy’ to the Middle 
East is still to be determined (and its relationship with the ‘Muslim 
democracy’ of the book’s title is not elucidated): following the military coup 
in Egypt in July 2013 and the regression of Iraq into war and turmoil, it is 
only to the Tunisian case that it may be applicable and, even there, the 
elections of October– December 2014 demonstrated a rebounding of secular 
forces which are resisting ‘unsecular democracy’. Nevertheless, ‘unsecular 
democracy’ will most probably have enduring value, in that it captures the 
idea that the social sphere will remain politicized and conservative even in 
those Middle Eastern states which adopt democratic institutions in the 
formal sense. For some, such a democracy is an oxymoron but others – 
including, arguably, Cesari (pp. 240 – 41) – see it as a stepping stone 
towards a full-blown liberal democracy. 
Parts of the Arab Middle East are currently in the throes of counter-
revolution and war, both common – some would say inevitable – outcomes 
 of revolution. This does not mean that the 2011 uprisings have not jolted the 
region towards democratic change. It will happen, two steps forward, one 
step back, and two developments have already pushed in that direction: the 
first is the popular turn-around in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood 
following its one year in power; the second is the rallying of secular forces 
in Tunisia against the Islamists. Both are signs that some degree of healthy 
political contestation has been re-injected into the region’s body politic. 
However, Middle Eastern polities will not evolve towards a uniform 
condition called ‘democracy’, nor will they do so in a uni-linear fashion. 
Rather than thinking about democracy in the Middle East as a system which 
polities either attain or not – judged against a mythically prototypical 
‘Western democracy’ – it is more fruitful to think about the process of 
accomplishing democratic reforms and the piecemeal building of democratic 
institutions, achievements along the way towards varied and imperfect 
outcomes. 
When considering the prospects of democracy in the Middle East region, it 
is right and proper to consider the values of significant actors, such as the 
Islamists (but also secular political forces and the wider citizenry), and ask 
whether they have truly espoused democratic and liberal principles. 
However, democratic change can alternatively be seen as a ‘second best 
solution to intractable conflicts of interest’ (Waterbury, 1994: 34) – the 
product of bargaining or a struggle for power between a constellation of 
political forces, even if these forces do not hold democratic or liberal views. 
From this perspective, a democratic polity emerges out of a vibrant political 
scene which combines, for example, popular participation and pressure from 
below, a dynamic and sophisticated political class, civil society 
organizations, political parties and other centres of political power. If, 
indeed, democracy is not directly or primarily dependent on the political 
preferences and standpoints of significant actors and citizens, Islamists will 
play a positive role in its emergence in the Middle East, even as ‘illiberal 
democrats’. 
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